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ABSTRACT 
  This Article investigates the hypothesis that the most important 
and, often, controversial and divisive cases—so called “big” cases—
are disproportionately decided at the end of June. We define a “big 
case” in one of four ways: front-page coverage in the New York 
Times; front-page and other coverage in four national newspapers 
(the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and 
Chicago Tribune); the number of amicus curiae briefs filed in a case; 
and the number of subsequent citations by the Supreme Court to its 
decision in a case. We find a statistically significant association 
between each measure of a big case and end-of-term decisions even 
after controlling for the month of oral argument (cases argued later in 
the term are more likely to be decided near the end of the term) and 
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case attributes (e.g., dissents and concurrences) that increase the time 
it takes to decide a case. We also speculate on why big cases cluster at 
the end of the term. One possibility is legacy and reputational 
concerns: when writing what they think will be a major decision, the 
Justices and their law clerks take more time polishing until the last 
minute with the hope of promoting their reputations. Another is that 
the end-of-term clustering of the most important cases may tend to 
diffuse media coverage of and other commentary regarding any 
particular case, and thus spare the Justices unwanted criticism just 
before they leave Washington for their summer recess. 
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INTRODUCTION 
High court judges manipulate the timing of their decisions. In 
Brazil, for example, judges have been known to delay hearing the 
case or announcing or publishing the decision until there is a more 
favorable political climate (or court).1 Strategic timing of judicial 
 
 1. See, e.g., Diego Werneck Arguelhes & Ivar A. Hartmann, Timing Control Without 
Docket Control: How Individual Justices Shape the Brazilian Supreme Court’s Agenda (May 
28, 2014) (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Empirical Studies on 
Constitutional Courts, FGV Direito Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). Werneck and Hartmann describe a procedure in which an individual Justice can 
request to “take a look” at a case (pedido de vista). Id. at *5. According to the data Werneck 
and Hartmann collected, use of the pedido de vista procedure has delayed decisions “for years, 
even decades.” Id. at *4. 
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decisions also seems to occur in the U.S. state courts.2 In contrast, the 
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, once they accept a case for 
review,3 rarely if ever delay decision in this way.4 The Court usually 
issues its decision within three months of oral argument;5 only the 
very rare case bounces around the chambers for more than six 
months, and almost every decision is issued in the same term in which 
the case is argued.6 
Still, commentators have long speculated that the most important 
and, often, controversial and divisive cases—the “big” or 
“blockbuster” cases (we’ll use “big cases” for brevity)—are issued in 
June (the last month before the Court’s summer recess) and mostly in 
the last week or two of June7—the so-called “end-of-term crunch.”8 
 
 2. An example is the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which delayed an opinion in 
connection with the 2006 nomination of Associate Justice Peter Zarella for chief justice: 
Upon the announcement of Chief Justice Sullivan’s impending retirement, Governor 
M. Jodi Rell nominated Associate Justice Peter Zarella to be elevated to chief justice. 
However, unbeknownst to the governor and just before her announcement, the chief 
justice had already begun to play politics with the Zarella nomination. In early March 
2006, the chief justice had ordered the reporter of judicial decisions to delay the 
printing of a controversial decision regarding freedom of information and the judicial 
branch. Thus, in his attempt to aid and elevate his friend Justice Zarella, Chief Justice 
Sullivan obstructed the course of the nomination process by depriving the 
Connecticut General Assembly’s Judiciary Committee of knowledge of Justice 
Zarella’s concurrence in the opinion. 
J. Michael Green, Constitutional Crisis Averted in Connecticut, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 114, 114–15 
(2008) (citations omitted). 
 3. There are many examples, though there is little systematic evidence, that the Justices 
use their discretionary power over which cases they will hear to set their plenary agenda to 
avoid certain issues. See, e.g., DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT (1980).  
 4. The Court can avoid reaching a decision on the merits even after it has agreed to 
decide the case, for example, by finding that the Court lacks jurisdiction (if there’s no 
jurisdiction, the case is nonjusticiable), though it usually explains its decision. See, e.g., 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 578 (1992); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974). 
 5. Our sample includes 7219 cases decided between the 1946 and 2012 terms. We exclude 
all reargued cases and those argued or decided in special sessions (usually in July, August, or 
September), as well as Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952), which was continued twice. This 
eliminates 181 cases. The mean time from oral argument to decision in the 7219 sample is 83.6 
days (the median is 75), with a standard deviation of 46.2. 
 6. This holds for 99 percent of the cases. Only reargued cases are held over. Of the 7400 
cases decided between the 1946 and 2012 terms, 171 were reargued but only 34 in the same 
term. 
 7. The Supreme Court’s term begins on the first Monday in October. The Court begins its 
summer recess in June or early July. Of the 67 terms in our dataset (1946–2012), only 12 ended 
in July (OT 1995 was the last to do so). 
PEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2015  3:19 PM 
994 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:991 
This shouldn’t be surprising. More than 30 percent of the decisions in 
a term are issued in June (see Figure 1) and more than half of the 
June decisions come in the last week (see Figure 2). But the claim 
about big cases is stronger: namely, that they are disproportionately 
decided at the end of June. Imagine the Court decides 100 cases in a 
term and of these 15 are decided in the last week of June. Suppose 
further that the Court decides 20 big cases in the term and 10 of them 
in that last week. Then big cases make up a disproportionate share of 
cases decided in the last week of June—67 percent (10/15) compared 
to 12 percent in the earlier parts of the term (10/85). 
Figure 1. Orally Argued Cases by Month of Decision, 1946–2012 
Terms 
Note: Excludes all reargued cases and those argued or decided in 
special sessions (usually July, August, or September). See supra note 5. 
 
 8. Richard L. Hasen, What’s Taking the Supreme Court So Long?, DAILY BEAST (June 
21, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/21/what-s-taking-the-supreme-court-so-
long.html. 
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Figure 2. Cases Decided in the Last Four Weeks of the Term, 1946–
2012 Terms 
Note: Our sample consists of 2210 cases decided in June and 115 in July. 
Cases decided in July are included in the “Last Week” category. 
 
This Article investigates the phenomenon just described. We 
begin in Part I by identifying four approaches to determining a “big 
case”: front-page coverage in the New York Times; front-page and 
other coverage in four national newspapers (the New York Times, 
Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and Chicago Tribune); the 
number of amicus curiae briefs filed in a case; and the number of 
subsequent citations by the Supreme Court to its decision in a case. 
Also in Part I we ask whether a disproportionate number of big cases 
fall at the end of the term. The answer is yes: We find a statistically 
significant association between each measure of a big case and end-
of-term decisions. 
Part II of this Article considers three hypotheses for why big 
cases cluster in the last week of the term: 
  1. Suppose a case argued close to the end of the term is 
more likely to be decided near the end of the term than a case 
argued early in the term (what we call the “compression 
effect”). If big cases were disproportionately argued later in 
the term, this would make an end-of-term decision more 
likely. 
  2. Big cases have attributes such as more dissents and 
concurrences that tend to increase the time it takes the Court 
to decide a case, and thereby increase the probability that a 
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case will be decided near the end of the term (holding 
constant the month of oral argument, as hypothesis 1 
suggests). 
  3. The Court follows, or acts as if it follows, a policy of 
issuing the big decisions at the end of the term quite apart 
from the month of oral argument or the presence of attributes 
that increase the time it takes to decide a case. 
Our test of hypothesis 1, the “compression effect,” uncovered no 
significant relation between big cases and the date of oral argument. 
Part II.A analyzes hypothesis 2 by estimating two sets of regressions: 
one aimed at understanding the factors that predict the length of time 
from oral argument to decision and the other aimed at understanding 
the factors that predict whether a case is big or not. From that 
analysis we learn that big cases possess many of the same attributes 
that lengthen decision time. For example, they are often more 
controversial and divisive than the average case and therefore require 
more time to decide.9 Cases that take more time to decide will tend to 
cluster at the end of the term. 
Part II.B considers whether the Court is more likely to decide big 
cases at the end of the term even after we hold constant variables 
such as the month of oral argument (critical to the compression 
effect), the term of the decision, and work-related and other 
attributes that lengthen the time it takes to decide a case. The 
regression analysis shows that there is still a significant “pure” or 
“net” big-case effect separate from the compression effect, the term 
of the Court, and work-related and other attributes. In other words, 
we are left with the finding that the Court does, in fact, save the best 
for last—or at least acts as if it does. 
We conclude with some speculation, based on reputational, 
public-relations, and social concerns, about why the Justices appear to 
follow a policy of issuing a disproportionate number of big-case 
decisions late in the term. 
I.  SOME PRELIMINARIES 
Without concrete measures of what is a “big case,” we can’t 
systematically test claims about the Court issuing its important 
decisions at the end of the term. We explain the measures we use and 
 
 9. On the basis of anecdotal evidence, Hasen reaches a similar conclusion. Id. 
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then show that there is an association between big cases (regardless of 
the measure we use) and end-of-term decisions. 
A. Defining a Big Case 
Although it’s widely believed that decisions in the big cases are 
disproportionately issued at the term’s end, to our knowledge no one 
has subjected the proposition to empirical testing. This may be 
because of the difficulty in defining a big case other than by “I know 
it when I see it.” We take a more systematic approach by using four 
measures of whether a case is “big”: 
  (1) New York Times: whether the Times carried a front-
page story about the case on the day after the Court decided 
it.10 About 14 percent (1016 cases) of the 7219 cases in our 
database received front-page coverage. 
  (2) Case Salience Index: whether the Times, Washington 
Post, Los Angeles Times, or Chicago Tribune carried a story 
about the case. A case that received front-page coverage is 
scored as a 2; if it received coverage elsewhere in the paper, 1. 
The index ranges from 0 to 8 (8 being coverage on the first 
page of all four papers).11 
  (3) Total Amicus Briefs: total number of amicus curiae 
briefs filed in the case. At least one amicus brief was filed in 
62 percent of the cases in our sample (4460 out of 7219 cases); 
a single amicus brief in 17 percent (1245 cases); two to five 
amicus briefs in 28 percent (2053 cases); and more than five in 
16 percent (1162 cases). One hundred forty-three amicus 
briefs were filed in one case, but that’s rare; in fewer than 2 
percent of the cases were 20 or more briefs filed (131 cases). 
  (4) Citations: number of Supreme Court citations between 
1946 and 2001 to cases in our dataset.12 Obviously the older 
the case, the greater the number of citations it is capable of 
 
 10. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72 
(2000).  
 11. The Case Salience Index was invented by Todd A. Collins and Christopher A. Cooper, 
Case Salience and Media Coverage of Supreme Court Decisions: Toward a New Measure, 65 
POL. RES. Q. 396 (2012). We thank the authors for their data, which span the 1953–2004 terms. 
 12. The dataset, available at http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/judicial.htm, was developed and used 
by James H. Fowler and Sangick Jeon in The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC. 
NETWORKS 16 (2008). 
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receiving.13 Because we’re comparing the number of citations 
to cases decided at the end of June with the number decided 
earlier in the term, the fact that older cases tend to have more 
citations shouldn’t bias our results too much. (Cases decided 
early in the term are, at most, only nine months older than 
those decided in June.) Still, when we use citations as a proxy 
for big cases we include dummy variables for each term in 
order to hold constant the effect of the age of a case on 
citations. 
Table 1. Summary Information on the Four Measures of Big Cases14 
Measure Coding No. of Cases  
(Terms 
Covered) 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Range 
(1) New York 
Times 
1 (on front page);  
0 (not on front page) 
7219 
(1946-2012) 
0.141 
(0.348) 
0-1 
(2) Case 
Salience Index 
(CSI) 
0 (no coverage in any of four 
newspapers) to 8 (front-page 
coverage in all of four 
newspapers) 
5896 
(1953-2004) 
 
2.761 
(2.160) 
0-8 
(3) Total 
Amicus Briefs 
Number of briefs 7219 
(1946-2012) 
3.033 
(6.162) 
0-143 
(4) Citations Number of Supreme Court 
citations to Supreme Court 
cases 
6304 
(1946-2001) 
11.467 
(16.064) 
0-266 
Note: The N of 6304 in row 4 (Citations) is the number of cases that cite the cases in our dataset. 
 
 
Political scientists often use the first two measures15—as we have 
in our work16—but there are two difficulties.17 The first is that 
newspaper coverage (particularly front-page coverage, which is the 
New York Times measure and part of the Case Salience Index) of a 
Supreme Court decision is negatively affected by competition from 
other events that occur at the same time, including another Supreme 
Court decision (or decisions) issued the same day. As a result even a 
big case may sometimes not receive much or even any newspaper 
coverage. The second difficulty is that newspaper coverage, being 
 
 13. A simple regression of the number of citations to each case on the logarithm of the 
term yields a regression coefficient of -0.475 and a t-value of 17.8.   
 14. For cases included in and excluded from our sample, see supra note 5.  
 15. The Case Salience Index is more recent, see supra note 11, but the concept underlying it 
is similar to that of the New York Times measure. 
 16. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013). 
 17. Epstein & Segal, supra note 10. 
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motivated by journalistic concerns, may bear little relation to the 
legal importance of a case. For example, in 2009, Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts18 appeared on the front page of the Times, but Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal19 did not. Melendez-Diaz is an important case. It held that 
reports by crime labs are inadmissible unless the analyst who 
prepared the report testifies at the defendant’s trial20—a ruling that 
upset ninety years of practice in most states.21 Although less 
interesting to the average newspaper reader, Iqbal is the more 
important case because along with the Court’s earlier decision in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly22 it made it easier for federal district courts 
to dismiss cases before pretrial discovery. To date courts have cited 
Iqbal in nearly 69,000 decisions, compared to only 2160 decisions that 
have cited Melendez-Diaz.23 Yet this deficiency in the two criteria that 
rely on newspaper coverage need not undermine our analysis; if the 
Justices delay decisions in order to blunt criticism they should be 
more apt to do so in cases, like Melendez-Diaz, that are likely to 
generate substantial media attention. 
Our third measure, Total Amicus Briefs, stands for the 
importance of the case to persons who either consider it very 
interesting or significant or are most likely to be affected by the 
Court’s decision. Unlike our other criteria, amicus briefs are not only 
an indicator of the importance of a case but also a factor that may 
increase the time between oral argument and decision and so cause a 
case to be decided later in the term independently of the importance 
of the case.24 Although the Justices probably read few of the amicus 
 
 18. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 19. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 20. Or, if the analyst is unavailable, the defense must have had a “prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309. 
 21. See id. at 349 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 22. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 23. Figures are from Shepard’s, accessed through LEXIS Advance on September 22, 2013.  
 24. See Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, The Supreme Court’s Reliance on 
Amicus Curiae in the 2012-13 Term, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 18, 2013), available at http://www.arnold
porter.com/resources/documents/NLJ_The%20Supreme%20Court’s%20Reliance%20on%20A
micus%20Curiae%20in%20the%202012-13%20Term_Franze%20and%20Anderson.pdf. They 
ask why the Court hasn’t “discouraged amicus filings” if “more briefs equal more work.” Id. at 
*1. The answer, they propose, is that the Justices “find the briefs useful.” Id. This conclusion 
may be self-serving (the authors are lawyers at Arnold & Porter, which represents amici in the 
Supreme Court), but scholarly studies confirm it. See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr., FRIENDS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT (2008); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus 
Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000). In addition to providing 
empirical evidence of the influence of amicus briefs, Kearney and Merrill note that “the most 
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briefs filed, their law clerks at least skim them in order to “separate 
the wheat from the chaff” for their bosses.25 The fact that most 
Justices cite to amicus briefs in a third or more of their opinions 
suggests that someone is reading them (though probably only a law 
clerk—yet law clerks write most judicial opinions, in the Supreme 
Court as in most other American courts). And the more there are, the 
more there is to read,26 although this doesn’t mean that more is read. 
Conceivably if more amicus briefs are filed in cases decided late in the 
term, this could be a sign that these were big cases or could just mean 
that cases in which a large number of briefs are filed take more time 
to decide. 
The fourth measure of case importance that we use is citations in 
Supreme Court opinions to earlier Supreme Court decisions. 
Citations are a widely used measure of importance and influence and 
have the virtue of relying on the Court to tell us ex post what it 
considers to have been an important or unimportant decision.27 Of 
course it’s always possible that the Justices who believed a case to be 
big at the time they decided it turned out to be mistaken.28 
As Table 2 shows, the four measures are positively and 
significantly correlated. The strongest correlation is between the two 
media measures, since the New York Times is a factor in both. 
Overall, the correlations are modest. This justifies our approach of 
using several measures of a big case rather than just one. 
 
common reaction among lawyers and judges [toward amicus briefs] is moderately supportive. 
Amicus briefs, it is said, can provide valuable assistance to the Court in its deliberations.” 
Kearney & Merrill, supra, at 745. This view, they point out, is not universally shared. Id. at 745–
46. One of us (Posner) has written, “The vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies 
of the litigants and duplicate the arguments made in the litigants’ briefs, in effect merely 
extending the length of the litigant’s brief.” Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 
F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 25. See Franze & Anderson, supra note 24, at *1. (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 102–03 (2008)). 
 26. See, e.g., id.; Ryan J. Owens & Lee Epstein, Amici Curiae During the Rehnquist Years, 
89 JUDICATURE 127, 132 (2005). 
 27. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 251–52 (1976); William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & 
Michael Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271–72 (1998); see also James H. Fowler, Timothy R. Johnson, James F. 
Spriggs II, Sangick Jeon & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the 
Legal Importance of Supreme Court Precedents, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 325–26 (2007). 
 28. Also bear in mind, as noted earlier, that the number of citations is biased downward 
because the data cover all citations in the 1946 to 2001 period. Thus, the closer the decision date 
of a case to 2001, the fewer the number of years to accumulate citations. 
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Table 2. Correlation Coefficients for the Four Measures of Whether a 
Case Is Big 
 CSI Amicus Briefs Citations 
New York Times 0.62** 0.23** 0.28** 
CSI  0.26** 0.30** 
Amicus Briefs   0.10** 
Notes: 
(1) Correlations of Citations with the other measures of big cases are partial correlations that 
hold constant the term of the decision to take account of the negative relationship between 
citations and term. 
(2) **Significant at .01 level. 
 
B. A First Look at Whether Big Cases Cluster at the End of the Term 
As Figure 3 shows, all four measures of a big case support the 
existence of an end-of-term cluster effect. Overall, 24.2 percent of all 
cases decided in the last week of June make the front page of the New 
York Times compared to only 15.3 percent for cases decided earlier in 
June and to 11.3 percent for cases decided in all other months 
combined. The CSI averages 3.6 for cases decided in the last week in 
June, 2.8 for earlier in June, and 2.6 for the other months. The 
average number of amicus curiae briefs per case is 5.2 for cases 
decided in the last week of June, 3.1 for cases decided earlier in June, 
and 2.5 for cases decided in other months. The number of citations 
averages 16.3 per case for cases decided in the last week of June, 11.1 
for cases decided in other weeks in June, and 10.4 for cases decided in 
other months. These differences between the last week and earlier in 
the term are statistically significant for all four measures. 
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Figure 3. Big Cases as the Term Progresses, Month-by-Month (with the 
Last Week of June Separated Out) 
Notes: 
(1) Month is the month the case was decided. We include the small number of cases 
decided in July (115) in the last week of the term in June. 
(2) p ≤ .01 for all month comparisons (and the first three weeks of June) with the last 
week of June. 
(3) We exclude 18 cases decided in October; 171 reargued cases; 9 cases argued or 
decided in special sessions (usually over the summer); and one case that was continued 
twice. See supra note 5. 
II.  EVALUATION OF THE THREE HYPOTHESES 
Figure 3 provides evidence that the Court does stack a 
disproportionate number of decisions in big cases in the last week of 
the term. We explore three explanatory hypotheses. Hypothesis 1, the 
compression effect, is that because the Court almost always decides 
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cases in the same term they were argued,29 the later the date of oral 
argument the more likely the case will be decided near the end of the 
term. So if more big than small cases happen to be argued late in the 
term, they would be expected to be decided later. The data, however, 
does not support this hypothesis. We find no significant relation 
between any of our four measures and the date of oral argument.30 
A. Work-Time Factors and End-of-Term Clustering 
Hypothesis 2 states that big cases possess attributes that lengthen 
the time to decision. They may be more contentious, more divisive, 
and therefore generate a higher fraction of dissenting and concurring 
opinions, and are very unlikely to be decided in short per curiam 
opinions. The more opinions in a case, the longer the case should take 
to decide. Justices writing separately—that is, dissenting or 
concurring—may not begin to write until the majority opinion is 
circulated, or if they do begin earlier, they will often have to revise 
when they see that opinion. The Justice assigned the majority opinion 
may feel that he has to revise it in light of the separate opinions, and 
his revisions may engender a new round of revisions by the authors of 
those other opinions. It wouldn’t be at all surprising, therefore, that 
multi-opinion decisions would cluster at the end of the term—not 
because they are big but because they have attributes that elongate 
the work time required for completion and issuance. We use 
regression analysis to explore this hypothesis. 
1. Regression Models.  To test the effect of work-time factors on 
end-of-term clustering, we estimate the following two regression 
models from data on orally argued cases in the 1946 to 2012 terms. 
 
(1) Days-to-Decide = f(Month, Work-Related Attributes, Other 
   Case Attributes, Term) + u 
(2) Big Case = g(Case Attributes, Term) + w 
 
 29. This holds for about 99 percent of the cases argued in the 1946–2012 terms. See supra 
note 6. 
 30. We estimated regressions in which the dependent variable is one of the four big 
measures and the independent variable is the difference in days between the end-of-term date 
and the oral-argument date (the smaller the difference, the closer oral argument is to the end of 
the term). In three regressions (New York Times, Citations, and Amicus), the coefficient on the 
independent variable is insignificant. In one (the CSI) it is significant but indicates that the 
earlier (not later) the case is argued, the greater the value of the CSI. 
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In equation (1), the dependent variable Days-to-Decide is the 
difference in number of days from the date of oral argument to the 
date of decision. The independent variables are as follows; u denotes 
the residual. 
a. Seven dummy variables (denoted by Month) for the month of 
oral argument (starting in October and ending in April where 
May/June is the omitted variable31). These variables test the 
compression effect. We expect the coefficients on the monthly 
dummies to be positive (since May and June have the shortest time 
between argument and decision), declining the closer the month is to 
the end of the term. 
b. Work-Related Variables, such as the number of opinions in a 
case, are expected to affect the time to decision. The variables we use 
are the fraction of dissents (Dissent) and concurrences (Concur); the 
number of issues (Issues) in the case (79 percent of our sample 
involve one issue, 17 percent involve two issues, and only 4 percent 
involve three or more issues); the number of Justices (Justices) voting 
(9 Justices vote in 78 percent of the cases, 8 in 18 percent, and 
between 5 and 7 in fewer than 5 percent); and a Per Curiam variable 
(about 7 percent of our sample are per curiam decisions), which is 
likely to reduce the time to decision because cases decided per curiam 
tend to be less contentious, and more often unanimous, than cases 
decided in a signed opinion.32 Thus we expect positive coefficients on 
all the work-related variables but a negative coefficient on the Per 
Curiam variable. 
c. Other Attributes include characteristics of cases that may 
lengthen decision time, but we lack a strong conviction that they do. 
Consider the number of amicus briefs (the Amicus variable). One 
could argue that the greater the number, the more time the Justices 
and their clerks will spend reading them and therefore the more time 
it will take to decide the case. But one could equally argue that 
amicus briefs may supply information or arguments that reduce the 
amount of research and analysis that law clerks need to do. We also 
include in Other Attributes dummy variables for whether the decision 
holds a statute unconstitutional (Unconstitutional) or formally alters, 
 
 31. We combine May and June into a “single” month because only 79 (about 1 percent) of 
the cases in our sample are argued during these two months. 
 32. In our dataset, the Court decided 59.2 percent of the per curiam decisions by a 
unanimous vote compared with 36 percent of the cases resulting in a signed opinion. The 
difference is statistically significant. 
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by overruling or limiting, a precedent (Precedent Alteration).33 Other 
Attributes also include Civil Liberties and Economic Activity dummy 
variables (where the omitted variable is all other issues) to account 
for the possibility that these areas may present more (or less) difficult 
questions and take more (or less) time to decide.34 
All these variables may indicate a more complex case, implying 
positive coefficients in equation (1). 
d. Last we include dummy variables for each term (Term). This 
allows us to hold constant term-specific effects that may elude the 
other variables in the regression. 
In equation (2) the dependent variable is a dummy variable of 
one of three measures of a big case: New York Times, CSI, and 
Citations. We do not estimate equation (2) for the number of amicus 
briefs because they are filed before the case is decided and so can’t be 
influenced by the outcome variables in equation (2). 
A key feature of equation (2) is that it contains many of the same 
independent variables as are in (1) because many of the work-related 
and other attributes tested in equation (1) are also proxies for the 
more important and divisive cases, which are the cases likely to 
receive media coverage and many citations. Equation (2) also 
includes the Civil Liberties and Economic Activity variables in order 
to test whether newspapers are more likely to cover civil liberties 
than other areas of law, and a dummy variable for the ideological 
direction of the decision (the Conservative variable, 0 for a liberal and 
1 for a conservative decision). Liberal newspapers may find a liberal 
decision more newsworthy, or at least more pleasing to their readers, 
than a conservative one; a further reason may be to avoid calling 
attention to conservative decisions.35 
Table 3 defines and presents summary statistics of the variables 
used in the regression analysis, and Table 4 presents the regression 
 
 33. Unconstitutional and Precedent account for 6.6 percent and 1.9 percent of the cases 
respectively. 
 34. Civil Liberties accounts for 51.5 percent of all cases, Economic Activity (including labor 
and tax cases) for 29.5 percent, and all other issues (which include judicial power, federalism, 
interstate relations, and a few other small categories) for about 19 percent. 
 35. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. 
Daily Newspapers, 78 ECONOMETRICA 35 (2010), show that the political slant of newspapers 
depends on the views of their readers. An extension of this argument is that newspapers are 
more likely to cover Supreme Court decisions that conform to their readers’ ideological 
preferences. Another possibility, however, is that liberal and conservative papers cover the 
same cases but slant coverage to conform to their readers’ preferences. 
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results. (To simplify the table we omit the individual regression 
coefficients for the monthly and term dummy variables.36) 
Table 3. Variable Definitions in Analysis of Important Cases 
Variable Definition No. 
Observations 
(Terms) 
Mean 
(Std. 
Deviation) 
Range 
Dependent Variables 
Time To Decide Number of days from oral 
argument to decision date 
7219 
(1946-2012) 
83.57 
(46.20) 
0-269 
NYT 1=front-page coverage in New 
York Times & 0=otherwise 
7219 
(1946-2012) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0-1 
CSI Index of coverage in four major 
newspapers  
5896 
(1953-2004) 
2.76 
(2.16) 
0-8 
Cites Number of citations in Supreme 
Court cases  
6304 
(1946-2001) 
11.47 
(16.06) 
0-266 
Independent Variables 
Month Dummy variables for month of 
oral argument 
7219 
(1946-2012) 
-- 0-1 
Work-Related 
Dissent Fraction of Justices dissenting 7219 
(1946-2012) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
0-0.44 
Concur Fraction of Justices concurring 7219 
(1946-2012) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0-0.89 
Per Curiam 1=per curiam decision & 
0=otherwise 
7219 
(1946-2012) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0-1 
Two Issues Dummy variable=1 if 2 issues & 
0=otherwise 
7219 
(1946-2012) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0-1 
Three Issues Dummy variable=1 if 3 or more 
issues & 0=otherwise 
7219 
(1946-2012) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0-1 
Nine Justice Vote Dummy variable=1 if 9 Justices 
vote & 0=otherwise 
7219 
(1946-2012) 
0.78 
(0.42) 
0-1 
Other Attributes 
Total Amicus Number of amicus briefs filed 7219 
(1946-2012) 
3.03 
(6.16) 
0-143 
Civil Liberties 1=civil liberties & 0=otherwise 7219 
(1946-2012) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0-1 
Economic Activity 1=economic activity & 
0=otherwise 
7219 
(1946-2012) 
0.29 
(0.46) 
0-1 
Unconstitutional 1= unconstitutional & 
0=otherwise 
7219 
(1946-2012) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0-1 
Precedent 
Alteration 
1=formal alteration of precedent 
& 0=otherwise 
7218 
(1946-2012) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0-1 
Ideology 1=conservative decision and 
0=liberal decision 
7143 
(1946-2012) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0-1 
Term Dummies Dummy variables for each term 7219 
(1946-2012) 
-- 0-1 
 
 36. The full regressions are available from the authors. 
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Table 4. Regression Analysis of Number of Days Between Oral 
Argument and Decision and of Big-Case Measures (t-ratios in 
parentheses) 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables No. of Days 
(4.1) 
New York 
Times 
(4.2) 
CSI Index 
(4.3) 
Cites 
(4.4) 
Month Yes** - - - 
Work-Related 
Dissent 76.49** 
(28.87) 
0.19** 
(9.87) 
1.81** 
(11.98) 
6.90** 
(6.34) 
Concur 67.17** 
(18.40) 
0.17** 
(8.00) 
1.60** 
(8.06) 
16.27** 
(9.53) 
Per Curiam -18.57** 
(8.89) 
-0.06** 
(3.34) 
-0.55** 
(6.41) 
-8.33** 
(15.09) 
Two Issues 0.91 
(0.78) 
0.02* 
(2.14) 
0.05 
(0.82) 
0.95* 
(2.01) 
Three or More Issues 6.90** 
(3.04) 
0.07** 
(5.27) 
0.37** 
(2.75) 
3.91** 
(3.54) 
Nine Justice Vote -6.74** 
(5.58) 
- - - 
Other Attributes 
Total Amicus 0.65** 
(5.13) 
0.01** 
(10.93) 
0.15** 
(10.53) 
0.24** 
(3.99) 
Civil Liberties 3.45** 
(2.99) 
0.10** 
(8.85) 
1.03** 
(15.44) 
3.88** 
(8.93) 
Economic Activity -0.75 
(0.63) 
0.01 
(0.49) 
0.16* 
(2.42) 
-2.84** 
(6.73) 
Unconstitutional 6.07** 
(3.16) 
0.05** 
(5.69) 
0.75** 
(7.61) 
6.33** 
(6.12) 
Precedent Alteration 6.09* 
(1.97) 
0.08** 
(4.60) 
0.47* 
(2.56) 
17.86** 
(5.18) 
Ideology - -0.03** 
(4.39) 
-0.17** 
(3.37) 
-0.98** 
(2.84) 
Term Dummies Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** 
Constant 28.67** 
(5.66) 
- -3.80** 
(4.75) 
-3.80** 
(4.75) 
No. Observations 7219 7143 5851 6241 
R2 0.39 0.22 0.28 0.27 
Terms 1946-2012 1946-2012 1953-2004 1946-2001 
Notes: 
(1) Regression 4.1 predicts the difference in number of days from the date of oral argument to the date of decision; 
Regressions 4.2-4.4 predict whether a case is big or not, using three different big-case measures. 
(2) We estimate robust standard errors in all regressions. Significant levels are indicated by * significant at .05 level 
and ** significant at .01 level. 
(3) Equation (4.2) is a logit regression, and the coefficients are the marginal effects of each variable at the mean values 
of the other variables. 
(4) Equation (4.1) includes 7 monthly dummy variables, October–April. The omitted monthly dummy covers oral 
arguments in May and June. 
(5) All regressions include individual term dummy variables. 
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2. Results.  As expected, the individual dummy month variables 
in 4.1 are positive and statistically significant (compared to cases 
argued in May and June, the omitted variable), and indicate that 
cases argued later in the term take significantly less time to decide. 
Starting with November, the values of the monthly dummy variable 
are smaller the later the month of oral argument (although the 
difference between November and December is not statistically 
significant). The one exception is for cases argued in October; the 
regression coefficient is significantly smaller than for cases argued in 
November, December, or January. On average it takes 55 days to 
decide cases argued in April, 94 days for cases argued in January, and 
101 days for cases argued in November (holding constant at their 
mean values the other variables in the regression). In short, we find a 
significant compression effect. 
Most of the work-related variables are significant and in the 
predicted direction. For example, one dissent increases decision time 
by 8.5 days (76.49 times 1/9), one concurrence by 7.5 days (67.17 times 
1/9), and a per curiam opinion decreases decision time by almost 18.6 
days (holding constant the values of the other independent variables). 
Two exceptions are worth mentioning. We find no significant 
difference in decision time between a case with one and two issues 
but a significant increase of 6.9 days for cases with three or more 
issues (fewer than 5 percent of the decisions in our sample resolve 
three or more issues, and about 91 percent of those decide no more 
than four issues). The other exception is that cases in which 9 Justices 
participate take 6.7 fewer days to decide than cases with fewer than 9 
Justices. This is puzzling because one would think that with more 
Justices voting, more time would be devoted to consultation and 
coordination among the Justices. A possible explanation for the 
anomaly is that the author of the assigned majority opinion (assigned 
in the hope that he can get 5 votes) has to work harder for 5 votes if 
there are 8 than if there are 9 Justices, and he can afford therefore to 
lose 4. With 8 Justices (which account for about 80 percent of the 
cases with fewer than 9 Justices), he can afford to lose only 3, so there 
may be more negotiating, increasing the time to decision.37 
 
 37. The difficulty with this explanation is that we also find that it takes more rather than 
less time to decide a case with 7 justices than a case with 8 Justices (only 304 cases have 7 
compared to 1279 with 8 Justices). If the critical factor is whether there is an even or odd 
number of Justices, we should have observed that cases with 7 Justices took less time to decide 
than ones with 8 Justices.  
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Among the non-work-related variables we find that the number 
of amicus briefs, civil liberties cases, cases that find a statute 
unconstitutional, and cases that formally alter a precedent are 
associated with significant increases in decision time. This suggests 
that these variables signify more complex and important cases that 
lengthen decision time independent of the work-related variables that 
are included in the regression. The regression results indicate that 10 
amicus briefs increase decision time by about 6.5 days compared to a 
case with zero amicus briefs, civil liberties cases add about 3.5 days to 
decision time, and holding a statute unconstitutional or formally 
altering a precedent increases decision time by 6.1 days. 
Here are some examples of the interplay among the variables in 
regression 4.1. Suppose a single-issue civil liberties case is argued in 
February, the decision is 5–4 with 2 concurrences, 9 Justices vote, and 
10 amicus briefs are filed (holding constant the other variables at 
their mean values). Equation (4.1) predicts that the case will take 
nearly 4 months (116 days) to decide compared to 2 months (61 days) 
for a case argued in the same month and decided with a unanimous 
signed opinion, no concurring opinions, and no amicus briefs. At the 
other extreme, it takes only 15 days to decide a civil liberties case 
argued in April that results in a per curiam decision without a single 
dissent or concurrence and with no amicus briefs. 
Now consider the two media measures of a big case (regressions 
4.2 and 4.3).38 The results support the hypothesis that coverage is 
positively and significantly related to the variables that proxy for the 
more important and controversial decisions.39 For example, regression 
4.2 predicts that a highly important and controversial civil liberties 
case with 4 dissents, 2 concurrences, and 10 amicus briefs has a 0.55 
probability of coverage on the front page of the New York Times 
compared to a 0.05 probability for a unanimous civil liberties case 
with no amicus briefs. And if a civil liberties case with the same 
characteristics also holds a law unconstitutional or formally alters an 
established precedent, the probability of coverage is 0.69 if 
unconstitutional and 0.74 if a precedent is altered. 
 
 38. Regression 4.2 is a logit regression because the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable, which takes the value 1 if the decision receives front-page coverage in the New York 
Times and 0 otherwise. 
 39. We exclude from the big-case regressions the month dummy variables and number of 
Justices voting because they should have no bearing on the importance or divisiveness of a case.  
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At the other extreme, there is only a 0.02 probability of front-
page coverage of a per curiam decision with no dissents, 
concurrences, or amicus briefs. Similarly, the CSI in civil liberties 
cases is 4.6 for 5–4 decisions with 2 concurrences and 10 amicus briefs, 
but only 1.5 for a per curiam decision with no dissents, concurrences, 
or amicus briefs. 
Regressions 4.2 and 4.3 show that conservative decisions are less 
likely to receive media coverage. The coefficients on the Ideology 
variable imply that the probability of front-page coverage in the New 
York Times for a conservative decision is 0.03 lower (or about 20 
percent lower than the mean coverage value of 0.14) and 0.17 lower in 
the CSI (or about 6 percent lower than its 2.76 mean). 
Our third big-case measure is the number of times a case is cited 
by the Supreme Court (regression 4.4). We expect and find that the 
number is positively and significantly related to variables that indicate 
the importance of a case. Less obviously, case citations in later cases 
are positively and significantly related to the divisiveness of a decision 
(not just its importance), as indicated by the regression coefficients on 
the fraction of dissents and concurrences. A possible explanation 
(which also explains the positive coefficients on the number-of-issues 
variables) is that a case with dissents and concurrences, because it 
thus has a greater number of opinions, provides more opportunities 
for subsequent citations. We also find that civil liberties cases 
generate significantly more citations (about 4 more) and economic 
cases significantly fewer (about 3 less) than cases in the omitted 
category, which account for about 19 percent of our sample and 
consist almost entirely of judicial power and federalism cases. And 
finally a possible explanation for why a liberal decision (the Ideology 
variable) is cited more often (almost 1 more citation per case) is that 
our sample contains slightly more liberal than conservative decisions 
(51 versus 49 percent).40 
B. So Why Do Big Cases Cluster at the End of the Term? 
The regressions in Table 4 confirm our second hypothesis: big 
cases have attributes that tend to increase the time taken to decide a 
 
 40. The later the date of a Supreme Court decision, the fewer the number of subsequent 
terms in which the case can garner citations. We adjust for this by including term dummy 
variables. As expected, the term dummy variables tend to become smaller the closer the 
decision is to the 2001 term, although many of the differences from year to year are not 
significant. 
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case, and so increase the probability that the case will be decided near 
the end of the term. But the regressions do not eliminate the third 
hypothesis: that the Justices act as if they postpone decision in a 
disproportionate number of big cases to the end of the term. 
We test this hypothesis by estimating what we call “gross” and 
“net” (or “pure”) big-case effects. The gross effect estimates the 
increase in the probability that the Court decides a big case in the last 
week or last two weeks of the term controlling for the month of oral 
argument and the term of the case;41 the net effect estimates this 
increase but also controls for attributes of the case that lengthen (or 
decrease, in the case of a per curiam decision) the time from oral 
argument to decision. 
1. Gross and Net (or Pure) Big-Case Effects.  We estimate gross 
and net big-case effects for each of our four measures of big cases by 
means of the following equations. 
 
Gross Big-Case Effect 
(3) End of Term = f(Big Case, Month & Term Dummies) + u 
 
Net or Pure Big-Case Effect 
(4a) End of Term = f(Big Case, Month & Term Dummies, 
   Work-Related Attributes) + v 
(4b) End of Term =f(Big Case, Month & Term Dummies, 
   Work-Related Attributes, Other 
   Attributes) + w 
 
End of Term is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Court issues its 
decision in the last week or last two weeks of the term and 0 
otherwise; Big Case is one of our four measures of a big case; Month 
& Term Dummies are dummy variables for the month of oral 
argument and the term of the court; Work-Related Attributes are the 
variables in Table 3 that directly affect the time the Court needs in 
order to decide a case; and Other Attributes include variables that are 
not clearly related to work time (like a civil liberties case) but still 
 
 41. The compression effect has two features: cases argued near the end of term take less 
time to decide because the Justices face the end-of-term constraint and are more likely to be 
decided in the last week or two of the term even though they take less time to decide. It still 
follows, however, that holding constant the month of oral argument, a case that takes more time 
to decide is more likely to be decided at the end of the term. 
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affect time to decision (see regression 4.1 in Table 4).42 We estimate 
two net big-case equations: 4a includes attributes that directly 
influence work time while 4b adds other attributes, such as a civil 
liberties dummy variable, that influence time to decision but are not 
clearly work-related attributes. From a statistical standpoint, we 
should find a smaller net big-case effect in 4b than 4a because the 
other attributes in 4b are positively correlated with our big-case 
measures and so should weaken the impact of a big case on the 
likelihood of a late decision. 
Table 5 presents the regression results. To simplify, we present 
the regression coefficients (column 3) for only the four big-case 
measures and not the other independent variables.43 To understand 
the organization of Table 5, consider the three New York Times 
regressions. Regression 5.1 indicates that big cases have a higher 
probability (0.103) of being decided in the last week holding constant 
the month and term of the decision. When we add the work-related 
attributes in 5.2, the Times coefficient falls to 0.042, and when we also 
add the other attributes in 5.3 the coefficient falls farther, to 0.036. All 
three regression coefficients are highly significant and, as predicted, 
the gross big-case effect (5.1) is significantly greater than the two net 
effects (5.2 and 5.2). We also find that the difference between the two 
net-effect coefficients is not significant, so that we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the increase in the probability of a last-week decision 
is the same for the two net big-case regressions. Although the 
regression coefficients of 0.103, 0.042, and 0.036 may appear small, 
they are large relative to the mean probability (0.160) of a last-week 
decision: the gross big-case effect adds 63 percent (0.103/0.160) and 
the two net effects between 23 and 26 percent (.036/.160 and 
.042/.160) to the mean probability. The final three columns of the 
table show the predicted probabilities of a last-week decision for 
cases argued in November, February, and April to highlight the 
interaction between big cases and month of oral argument. For 
example, the first row of regression 5.1 shows that the probability of a 
 
 42. We do not include the Amicus Briefs variable in equation (4b) or the regressions in 
Table 5 when we use the New York Times, CSI, or Cites as the big-case measure because we 
would then have two big-case measures (not one) in the regression for estimating the effects of a 
big case on the probability of an end-of-term decision. Moreover, since the Amicus measure is 
positively correlated with the other three big-case measures (see Table 2), we would weaken the 
effect of the other measures on the probability of a last-week decision by including the amicus 
measure. 
 43. The complete regressions are available from the authors. 
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last-week decision for New York Times big cases is .082 for November 
arguments, 0.354 for February, and .0670 for April. These 
probabilities are significantly lower for other cases (0.027 for 
November arguments, 0.145 for February, and 0.387 for April). 
Table 5. Logit Analysis of the Probability of Decision in the Last Week 
of the Term and Different Measures of Big Cases 
Equation Number & 
Measure of a Big 
Case 
 
 
(1) 
Attributes 
Added to 
Regression 
 
 
(2) 
Regression 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
 
 
(3) 
Probability Case Decided Last Week of 
Term 
Value of Big 
Measure 
(4) 
Month of Oral Argument 
Nov. 
(5) 
Feb. 
(6) 
April 
(7) 
(5.1) New York 
Times 
No .103** 
(12.33) 
1 0.082 0.354 0.670 
0 0.027 0.145 0.387 
(5.2) New York 
Times 
Work-Related 
Attributes 
.042** 
(6.28) 
1 0.033 0.200 0.570 
0 0.018 0.115 0.408 
(5.3) New York 
Times 
All Attributes .036** 
(5.34) 
1 0.030 0.183 0.551 
0 0.018 0.113 0.412 
(5.4) CSI Index 
 
No .024** 
(14.34) 
8 0.110 0.458 0.759 
0 0.013 0.084 0.254 
(5.5) CSI Index Work-Related 
Attributes 
.011** 
(8.31) 
8 0.041 0.256 0.649 
0 0.011 0.078 0.313 
(5.6) CSI Index 
 
All Attributes .010** 
(7.38) 
8 0.037 0.232 0.630 
0 0.011 0.079 0.327 
(5.7) Amicus 
Briefs 
No .008** 
(11.29) 
8 0.050 0.239 0.534 
0 0.025 0.132 0.357 
(5.8) Amicus 
Briefs 
Work-Related 
Attributes 
.004** 
(7.78) 
8 0.027 0.167 0.499 
0 0.017 0.111 0.383 
(5.9) Amicus 
Briefs 
All Attributes .004** 
(7.65) 
8 0.026 0.162 0.500 
0 0.017 0.108 0.385 
(5.10) Cites 
 
No .003** 
(11.06) 
15 0.036 0.282 0.457 
0 0.024 0.126 0.353 
(5.11) Cites Work-Related 
Attributes 
.001** 
(6.80) 
15 0.023 0.137 0.453 
0 0.017 0.108 0.387 
(5.12) Cites 
 
All Attributes .001** 
(5.66) 
25 0.022 0.133 0.452 
0 0.018 0.109 0.394 
Notes:  
(1) The regression coefficients in column (3) denote marginal effects at the mean values of all variables. All 
regressions use robust standard errors. Significant levels are denoted by * at .05 level and ** at .01 level. 
(2) The New York Times and Amicus regressions cover the 1946 to 2012 terms and include 7219 observations. The CSI 
regressions cover the 1953 to 2004 terms and 5896 observations, and the Cites regressions cover the 1946 to 2001 terms 
and 6304 observations. 
(3) The dependent variable in all logit regressions is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Court issued its decision in the 
last week of the term and 0 otherwise. All regressions include month and term dummy variables. Regressions 5.2, 5.5, 
5.8, and 5.11 also include the work-attribute variables: Fraction Dissent, Fraction Concur, Per Curiam, Two Issues, 
Three or More Issues, and Nine Justices. Regressions 5.3, 5.6, 5.9, and 5.12 include both the work- and other-attribute 
variables (the Civil Liberties, Economic Activity, Unconstitutional, and Precedent Alteration variables).  
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2. Results.  There is a significant increase in the probability of a 
last-week decision for the four big-case measures in every regression 
(column (3)). As expected, the gross big-case effect is always 
significantly greater than the two net effects; it varies from about 
twice (the amicus measure) to three times (the citations measure) the 
net measures. We find no significant difference between the two net 
big-case effects (one in the regression that includes work-related but 
not other attributes and the other in the regression that includes both 
types of variables). 
We showed in Table 4 that the compression effect results in cases 
argued later in the term taking less time on average to decide than 
cases argued early in the term (for example, 55 days for cases argued 
in April, 94 days for cases argued in January, and 101 days for cases 
argued in November). Notwithstanding the decline in decision time, it 
still turns out that the later in the term a case is argued, the likelier it 
is to be decided the last week, as seen in columns (5) through (7) for 
all big-case measures. The likelihood that a case will be decided the 
last week of June is always significantly greater if it is argued in April 
than in February, or in February than in November.44 And the impact 
of the month variable is large. For example, regression 5.1 estimates 
that the probability of a last-week decision is 0.67 for a case covered 
on the front page of the New York Times and argued in April but 0.39 
if the case does not receive front-page coverage (column (7)). These 
probabilities decline sharply the earlier the month of oral argument 
(0.35 and 0.15 for a February case and 0.08 and 0.03 for a November 
case). We find comparably large differences and sharp declines across 
months in the two net New York Times big-case regressions (5.2 and 
5.3) and, more generally, in all big-case measures. 
In the net big-case regressions, the coefficient in column (3) 
estimates the increase in the probability that a big case will be 
decided in the last week of the term holding constant the other 
variables at their mean values. Suppose the case attributes in the 
regression take different values than their means. For example, 
assume a 5–4 decision with 2 concurrences, 9 Justices voting, and 2 
issues decided. Using the New York Times big measure and 
regression 5.2 (the net big-case regression that includes work-related 
attributes), the probability of a last-week decision for a big case 
argued in April is 0.91 compared to 0.85 for other cases, 0.66 versus 
 
 44. More generally, this is true as we move from an earlier to later month, although the 
differences are not always statistically significant. 
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0.51 if the case is argued in February, and 0.22 versus 0.12 if it is 
argued in November.45 At the other extreme, consider a unanimous 
per curiam decision with 9 Justices voting on a single issue. Although 
a New York Times big case still makes a last-week decision more 
likely, the probabilities are small—0.17 versus 0.09 for a case argued 
in April, 0.04 versus 0.02 for one argued in February, and 0.005 versus 
0.003 for a case argued in November; and the differences for each 
month are not significant. 
Though not shown in Table 5, the Dissent, Concur, and Civil 
Liberties variables have significant positive effects, and the Per 
Curiam a significant negative effect (in all but the Citations 
regression), on the probability that a case will be decided in the last 
week. Cases having three or more issues are significantly more likely 
to be decided in the last week in the New York Times and Amicus 
regressions but not in the other two big-case measures. The number 
of Justices voting and the Unconstitutional and Economic Activity 
variables are insignificant in all regressions. Precedent Alteration is 
significant in the CSI Index and Amicus regressions but not in the 
Times and Citations regressions. The monthly dummy variables are 
individually significant in all but a few of the regressions, and the 
term dummy variables are always jointly significant. 
3. Additional Empirical Analysis. 
a. The Last Two Weeks of the Term.  In Table 6 (which follows 
the same format as Table 5 but presents results only for the New York 
Times and Amicus big-case measures46), we substitute the last two 
weeks of the term for the last week because the last week may be too 
stringent a test of the hypothesis that big cases disproportionately 
cluster near the end of the term. 
Overall, 23.8 percent of the cases in our database are decided in 
the last two weeks compared to 16 percent in the last week. But this 
may not signify that a big case is more likely to be decided in the last 
two weeks than in the last week. Suppose that a total of twenty and 
thirty cases are decided in the last week and the last two weeks, 
 
 45. Note that the probability differences between a big case and non-big case are 
statistically significant for each of the three months. 
 46. The results for the other two big-case measures are similar to those in Table 5—that is, 
the regression coefficients on the big-cases measures are always positive and significant, the 
gross coefficient is always greater than the two net coefficients, and the differences between the 
two net coefficients are never significant. 
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respectively, and that the corresponding numbers of big cases are ten 
and fifteen. The probability of a big decision is therefore 0.50 for both 
the last week and the last two. The New York Times measure of a big 
case (equations 6.1–6.3) indicates that the increase in the probability 
of a big case being decided in the last two weeks is 0.154 based on the 
gross effect and 0.068 based on the net effect. These probabilities are 
significantly greater than the corresponding increase in probabilities 
(0.103 and 0.039) in Table 5. We find a similar result for the Amicus 
big-case measure: 0.011 and 0.007 in Table 6 are significantly greater 
than the corresponding increases of 0.008 and 0.004 in Table 5. 
Table 6. Regression Analysis of the Probability of the Court Issuing Its 
Decision in the Last Two Weeks of the Term 
Equation Number 
& Big Measure 
 
 
 
(1) 
Attributes 
Added to 
Regression 
 
 
(2) 
Regression 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
 
 
(3) 
Probability Decision Issued in the Last 
Two Weeks of the Term 
Value of Big 
Measure 
(4) 
Month of Oral Argument 
Nov 
(5) 
Feb 
(6) 
April 
(7) 
(6.1) New 
York 
Times 
No .154** 
(13.19) 
1 0.104 0.494 0.831 
0 0.034 0.230 0.601 
(6.2) New 
York 
Times 
Work-Related 
Attributes 
.072** 
(6.83) 
1 0.045 0.333 0.797 
0 0.024 0.203 0.666 
(6.3) New 
York 
Times 
All Attributes .064** 
(5.96) 
1 0.043 0.317 0.788 
0 0.024 0.203 0.671 
(6.4) Amicus 
Briefs 
No .011** 
(10.58) 
8 0.062 0.346 0.723 
0 0.034 0.217 0.577 
(6.5) Amicus 
Briefs 
Work-Related 
Attributes 
.007** 
(7.62) 
8 0.035 0.277 0.748 
0 0.022 0.189 0.644 
(6.6) Amicus 
Briefs 
All Attributes .007** 
(7.56) 
8 0.035 0.274 0.750 
0 0.022 0.187 0.646 
Notes: 
(1) The regression coefficients in column (3) denote marginal effects at the mean values of all variables. All 
regressions use robust standard errors. Significance levels are indicated by * at .05 level and ** at .01 level. 
(2) The New York Times and Amicus regressions cover the 1946 to 2012 terms and include 7219 observations. 
(3) The dependent variable in all regressions is whether the Court issued its decision in the last two weeks of 
the term (1) or otherwise (0). All regressions include month and term dummy variables. Regressions 6.2 and 
6.4 also include the work-related attribute variables: Fraction Dissent, Fraction Concur, Per Curiam, Two 
Issues, Three or More Issues, and Nine Justices. Regressions 6.3 and 6.6 include both work-related and other-
attribute variables (Civil Liberties, Economic Activity, Unconstitutional, and Precedent Alteration). 
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In all models, the probability that a case will be decided in the 
last two weeks of the term is significantly greater for big cases than 
for other cases even after controlling for the month of oral argument, 
the term, and work-related and other case attributes.47 We also 
continue to observe significantly greater gross than net big-case 
effects in Table 6 as shown by the regression coefficients in column 
(3) and the predicted probabilities in columns (5)–(7). 
b. Does the Chief Justice Matter?  We consider here whether the 
big-case effects observed in Tables 5 and 6 depend on the identity of 
the Chief Justice. Maybe some Chief Justices follow a policy of saving 
the best for last and others do not. To test for this possibility, we use 
only the New York Times and Amicus big-case measures because they 
cover all cases decided between the 1946 and 2012 terms and so allow 
us to test for differences across the five Chief Justices during that 
period.48 
Table 7 presents the percentage of decisions covered on the front 
page of the New York Times during the last week of the term (column 
(3)) and in all other weeks (column (2)) for each Chief Justice. We do 
the same for cases with four or more amicus briefs (columns (5) and 
(4)).49 Since the Amicus measure is continuous (ranging from 0 to 
143), there is no obvious dividing line between a big and non-big case; 
our choice of four is arbitrary, and results in big cases being 25 
percent of our sample, compared to 14 percent if the New York Times 
measure is used instead. 
  
 
 47. The coefficients on the Dissent, Concur, Per Curiam, Civil Liberties, and 
Unconstitutional variables are significant and in the predicted directions in the Table 6 
regressions. Three or More Issues is positive and significant in regressions 6.2 and 6.5 but only 
marginally significant in regressions 6.3 and 6.6. The other work-related and other-attribute 
variables are in the predicted directions but are not significant except for the negative 
coefficient on the Nine Justices variable in regression 6.3. 
 48. Recall that the CSI covers the 1953–2004 terms and Citations the 1946–2001 terms, so 
these measures would exclude the Roberts era. 
 49. Table 7 compares only the last week of the term to earlier weeks, but notice that the 
results are substantially the same if we substitute the last two weeks for the last week. 
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Column (1) shows that the percentage of cases decided in the last 
week of the term has remained relatively constant (in the range of 
15.6 to 17.3 percent) since the Vinson Court. Big cases are 
disproportionately decided at the end of the term for all Chief 
Justices in our dataset (compare columns (2) and (3) with columns (4) 
and (5)).50 
Notice the sharp upward trend, starting with the Burger Court, in 
the percentage of cases in which four or more amicus briefs are filed. 
For cases decided in the last week (column (4)), the percentage rises 
from an average of 32.8 during Burger’s tenure to 86 percent during 
Roberts’ tenure. A similar result holds for cases decided before the 
last week; cases with four or more amicus briefs increase from 20 to 
60.8 percent. This is consistent with a large body of literature 
indicating that amicus curiae participation has increased markedly 
over time.51 Notice also that there is a slight downward trend in New 
York Times coverage since the Warren Court (columns (2) and (3)), 
which is more pronounced for cases decided before the last week of 
the term (column (2)). 
  
 
 50. Except for the Vinson era, all differences between columns (2) and (3) and columns (4) 
and (5) are statistically significant. 
 51. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 24, at 751; Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, 
Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation: An Appraisal of ‘Hakman’s 
Folklore’, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 311, 315–16 (1981). 
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Table 7. Coverage on Front Page of the New York Times and Number 
of Amicus Briefs by Week of Decision and Chief Justice, 1946–2012 
Chief Justice Percentage of 
Decisions 
Issued in the 
Last Week of 
the Term 
(1) 
Percentage of Cases 
Receiving Front-Page 
Coverage in the New York 
Times
Percentage of Cases with 4 or 
More Amicus Briefs 
Case 
Decided 
Before  
Last Week 
(2) 
Case 
Decided 
Last Week 
 
 
(3) 
Decisions 
Issued 
Before Last 
Week 
 
(4) 
Decisions 
Issued 
During Last 
Week 
 
(5) 
Vinson Court 
(1946-52 
Terms) 
15.6 9.5 
(606) 
14.3 
(112) 
3.5 
(606) 
5.4 
(112) 
Warren 
Court 
(1953-68 
Terms) 
16.2 15.7 
(1459) 
26.6** 
(282) 
3.2 
(1459) 
6.7** 
(282) 
Burger Court 
(1969-85 
Terms) 
16.0 11.1 
(1965) 
21.4** 
(373) 
20.0 
(1965) 
32.4** 
(373) 
Rehnquist 
Court 
(1986-04 
Terms) 
15.8 12.8 
(1554) 
29.2** 
(291) 
44.1 
(1554) 
61.9** 
(866) 
Roberts 
Court 
(2005-12 
Terms) 
17.3 6.7 
(477) 
24.0** 
(100) 
60.8 
(477) 
86.0** 
(100) 
Notes: 
(1) Numbers in parentheses in columns (1)–(4) denote the number of cases decided either in the last week of 
the term or in all other weeks. 
(2) The levels of significance are * at the .05 level and ** at the .01 level. Statistical comparisons are within 
each Chief Justice’s era. For example, for the Vinson Court the percentage of cases receiving front-page 
coverage in the New York Times is 14.3 for a case decided in the last week and 9.5 for cases decided in all 
other weeks. The absence of a * or ** indicates that the difference between 14.3 and 9.5 is not statistically 
significant. 
 
 
To explore the significance of the differences across Chief 
Justices, we re-estimate the regression models in Table 5, adding five 
dummy variables (one for each Chief Justice) which we interacted 
with our big-case variable. For the New York Times measure, the 
regression coefficient on each interacted Chief Justice variable 
estimates the increase in the probability of a last-week decision in 
cases that receive front-page Times coverage during the tenure of that 
Chief Justice. Because the interacted Amicus measure captures the 
increase in the probability for an additional amicus brief (which 
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makes a big case more likely) we expect the coefficient to be small 
but still positive. 
Table 8 presents the regression results. We show only 
coefficients (t-values in parentheses) for the five Chief Justice 
variables, although all regressions include the month of oral argument 
dummy variables. Regressions 8.2 and 8.5 also include work-related 
attributes, and regressions 8.3 and 8.6 include both work-related and 
other case attributes.52 
Table 8. Logit Analysis of the Probability that Case Was Decided in 
the Last Week of the Term by Chief Justice 
Equation 
Number & 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
(1) 
Big-Case 
Measures 
 
 
 
(2) 
Attributes 
Added to 
Regression 
 
 
(3) 
Regression Coefficients (t-ratios) 
Vinson 
 
(4) 
Warren 
 
(5) 
Burger 
 
(6) 
Rehn-
quist 
(7) 
Roberts 
 
(8) 
(8.1) Last 
Week 
New 
York 
Times 
No 0.061** 
(2.82) 
0.079** 
(4.64) 
0.100** 
(11.30) 
0.113** 
(7.79) 
0.176** 
(6.45) 
(8.2) Last 
Week 
New 
York 
Times 
Work- 
Related 
Attributes 
0.031 
(1.18) 
0.040* 
(2.53) 
0.034** 
(3.85) 
0.040** 
(3.31) 
0.079** 
(3.18) 
(8.3) Last 
Week 
New 
York 
Times 
All  
Attributes 
0.029 
(1.11) 
0.032* 
(2.21) 
0.027** 
(2.95) 
0.035** 
(2.90) 
0.072** 
(2.87) 
(8.4) Last 
Week 
Amicus 
Briefs 
No 0.008 
(1.22) 
0.017** 
(3.57) 
0.009** 
(5.78) 
0.007** 
(5.91) 
0.005** 
(9.10) 
(8.5) Last 
Week 
Amicus 
Briefs 
Work- 
Related 
Attributes 
0.008 
(1.08) 
0.013** 
(3.20) 
0.005** 
(3.49) 
0.003** 
(3.87) 
0.003** 
(8.59) 
(8.6) Last 
Week 
Amicus 
Briefs 
All  
Attributes 
0.008 
(1.11) 
0.013** 
(3.31) 
0.004** 
(3.39) 
0.003** 
(4.03) 
0.003** 
(8.48) 
Notes: 
(1) The regression coefficients in columns (4)–(8) denote marginal effects at the mean values of all variables. 
All regressions are clustered on the term variable. Significance levels are * at .05 level and ** at .01 level. 
(2) The New York Times and Amicus regressions cover the 1946 to 2012 terms and include 7219 observations. 
(3) The dependent variable in all regressions is whether the Court issued its decision in the last week of the 
term (1) or otherwise (0). All regressions include the month variables. Regressions 8.2 and 8.4 also include the 
work-related attribute variables: Fraction Dissent, Fraction Concur, Per Curiam, Two Issues, Three or More 
Issues, and Nine Justices. Regressions 8.3 and 8.6 include both work-related and other-attribute variables 
(Civil Liberties, Economic Activity, Unconstitutional, and Precedent Alteration). 
 
 
 
 52. We do not include the term dummies in the regressions because of the significant 
overlap with the Chief Justice variables. However, the regressions are clustered on the term 
variable.  
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Consider the coefficient of 0.176 for Roberts in regression 8.1. It 
tells us that the predicted probability of decision in the last week of 
the term is 0.176 greater for a Roberts Court case that appears in the 
New York Times than for one that does not, holding constant the 
month of the oral argument (the gross big-case effect for Chief Justice 
Roberts). We find smaller but still significant probability increases for 
the other Chief Justices. Except for Roberts, the differences across 
Chief Justices in regression 8.1 are not significant. As expected, we 
find smaller but still significant net big-case effects for all our Chief 
Justices, except Vinson, when we include work-related attributes 
(regression 8.2), and work-related plus other attributes (regression 
8.3). We also find no significant difference in the coefficients across 
Chief Justices in regressions 8.2 and 8.3—that is, we accept the null 
hypothesis that net or pure big-case effects across the five Chief 
Justices are not significantly different from each other. Turning to the 
Amicus measure, we find significant big-case effects in the three 
regressions for all the Chief Justices except Vinson. We also find no 
significant differences across Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts for both 
the gross and net big-case effects but a larger effect for Warren. We 
have no explanation why the Warren Court Amicus effects are 
significantly greater than the effects for the other Chief Justices. 
Overall, the effects we observed in Table 5 do not depend on the 
identity of the Chief Justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court decides its cases with dispatch—
with a tiny exception for the rare case held over for reargument in the 
next term, all cases are decided in the same term in which they are 
argued, hence in less than a year53—there is this curious phenomenon, 
quantified in this Article, of decisions in big cases tending to cluster at 
the end of the Court’s term. It could just be that big cases (as 
determined by our four measures of “bigness”) have attributes that 
make it take longer for the Court to decide them, most clearly 
perhaps the number of separate opinions in a case, which are bound 
to lengthen the path from argument to decision. But while the work-
 
 53. Many federal court of appeals decisions are decided a year or more after oral 
argument. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS SUMMARY—
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING JUNE 30, 2014, at 2 (last visited Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.us
courts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2014/appeal
s-fcms-summary-pages-june-2014.pdf.  
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time attributes do lengthen the path, clustering near the end of the 
term occurs even when they are not present; that is what we called the 
big-case net effect. 
And so the question is why. We can only speculate, but three 
possibilities come to mind. The first centers on legacy and 
reputational concerns: when writing what they think will prove to be 
major decisions the Justices take more time, polishing and polishing 
(or making their law clerks polish and polish, since nowadays law 
clerks do most judicial writing even in the Supreme Court) until the 
last possible moment, with the hope of promoting their own 
reputation. After all, excerpts of some of these big cases will find their 
way into the popular press and, more importantly, into casebooks that 
generations of law students will read; and, most importantly, the cases 
may continue to be remembered, discussed, and cited long, long after 
they are decided.54 
A second possible explanation is that the Justices delay certain 
decisions for public-relations reasons. The close proximity of 
decisions in the most important cases may tend to diffuse media 
coverage of and other commentary regarding any particular case, and 
thus spare the Justices unwanted criticism. But the opposite effect is 
possible: the expectation of a crowd of important cases at the end of 
the term can increase media attention, as in Slate’s “Breakfast Table” 
end-of-term roundup. 
Finally, though related to the second explanation, the Justices, 
most of whom have busy social schedules in Washington, may want to 
avoid tensions at their social functions by clustering the most 
controversial cases in the last week or two of the term—that is, just 
before they leave Washington for their summer recess.55 
 
 54. Another way to state this point is that the variables we include in the end-of-term 
regressions (month and term dummies, work-related and other attributes) do not fully account 
for the time the Justices spend on a case, so there remains a net big-case effect. 
 55. When asked by a questioner where Chief Justice Roberts was going after the end of the 
term, Roberts said that he “was about to leave for Malta, where he would teach a two-week 
class on the history of the Supreme Court. ‘Malta, as you know, is an impregnable island 
fortress,’ he said on Friday, according to news reports. ‘It seemed like a good idea.’” Adam 
Liptak, Roberts Makes a Getaway from the Scorn, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at A10. 
